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Lessons From the Field of Intra-National
Conflict Resolution
Dayle E. Spencer*
Honggang Yang

I.

**

DEFINING THE FIELD

Conflict is an inevitable fact in human social interaction. However, in different cultures and societies, there are various ways to
settle conflicts such as litigation, arbitration, avoidance, adjudication, toleration, negotiation, divination, feuding, and mediation.'
One of the approaches taken by the Carter Center's International
Negotiation Network ("INN") involves the process of third-party
mediation using an eminent person as the convener.
Mediation is the assistance of a third party not involved in the
dispute, who may be of a unique status that gives him or her
certain authority with the disputants, or perhaps an outsider who
may be regarded by them as a suitably neutral go-between. Third
parties, especially when seen as impartial and authoritative, generate influences 'or pressures toward agreement through the reduction of differences and the injection of new approaches or solutions.2 This Article examines the application of a process of third
party mediation to an armed conflict between the Government of
the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia ("PDRE"). and the

* Fellow and Director of Conflict Resolution Programs at The Carter Center of
Emory University.
** Research Associate of Conflict Resolution Programs at The Carter Center of
Emory University.
The authors would like to thank Joyce Neu and William J. Spencer for their suggestions and assistance.
I See INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION: ANALYSIS, APPROACHES, ISSUES (Victor A.
Kremenyuk ed., 1991); Sally E. Merry, Mediation in Nonindustrial Societies, in MEDIATION

RESEARCH 68 (Kenneth Kressel et al. eds., 1989); THE DISPUTING PROCESS-LAw IN TEN
SOCIETIES (Laura Nader & Henry F. Todd, Jr. eds., 1978); Dayle" E. Powell, Legal Permpec-

live, in INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION, supra, at 135-47; and Honggang Yang, Past is Prsent-egal Anthropology for Tonorrow (a winning entry from the First Annual Honors Essay
Contest at the University of South Florida (1990)).
2 See JEFFREY Z. RUBIN & BERT R. BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING
AND NEGOTIATION 54-57 (1975).
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Eritrean People's Liberation Front ("EPLF"), a process undertaken
by the INN from mid to late 1989.3
"Today's war is typically civil in nature, most often started by
rebels who either want to: (1) secede from the union, (2) have
some greater degree of autonomy, (3) have wider participation as
minorities in the way their government is run, or (4) have greater
access to economic resources within their country. " 4 Also, these
intra-national conflicts have diverse implications, that is, inter-tribal
relations, religious contentions, ideological contradictions, ethnic
unity and friction, racial tensions, territorial disputes, geopolitical
considerations, and so forth. There is a great variety of intra-national conflict, but what the INN attempts to do is aid in the
resolution of armed conflicts.
According to the SIPRI Yearbook (Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute), more than half of the major armed
conflicts occur within national boundaries.5 In 1990, thirty-one of
these were considered major,6 defined as having battle-related
deaths in excess of 1,000. 7 For the millions of people caught up
in these costly conflicts, there is virtually nowhere to turn for
assistance in finding peaceful means to resolve the problems. The
costs of intra-national conflicts include impeding development;
causing excessive childhood morbidity and mortality; creating a
massive population of refugees and displaced persons, thus spread-

3 The PDRE, or the Ethiopian Government, was headed by Mengistu Haile-Mariam,
who had been named chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council
("PMAC") in 1977 and became President of the Republic in 1987. The EPLF was
launched in 1970 as a breakaway faction of the Eritrean Liberation Front ("ELF") which
formed in 1958. The EPLF was an avowedly nonsectarian, left-wing group supported by
both Christians and Muslims. It had some 40,000-60,000 men and women under arms
and was committed to "the principle of self-determination." POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE
WORLD 1989 at 194-98 (Arthur S. Banks ed., 1989). Following the events described herein, the EPLF leadership formed the provisional government of Eritrea.
4 2 DAYLE E. SPENCER & WILLIAM J. SPENCER, THE INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION
NETWORK: A NEW METHOD OF APPROACHING SOME VERY OLD PROBLEMS 9 (1992).
5 Karin Lingren et al., Major Armed Conflicts in 1990, in SIPRI YEARBOOK 1991:
WORLD ARMAMENTS & DISARMAMENT 347.
6 Id. at 345. This is a slight decline from 33 conflicts in 1989.
7 Id. at 345-46. The 1,000 deaths threshold is an arbitrary number, determined by
adding the official death toll each year since the beginning of the conflict. For instance,
the Persian Gulf War is not included as a major conflict in 1990 because official sources
reported less than 100 deaths. On the other hand, the Northern Ireland conflict between
the IRA and the British Government is included because, since its inception, more than
2,000 deaths have been reported.'
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ing disease; devastating the environment; and causing recurring
famine.
Today's typical war (the Persian Gulf war and the Iran/Iraq
.war are notable exceptions to the general rule) is vastly different
than war as it was known when the global community created the
United Nations. Operating from the experience base of two successive world wars, the international leaders fashioned an organization designed to alleviate war as they knew it, international, and
thereby created serious barriers for the resolution of war as we
now know it-intra-national. Article Two, Section Seven of the
U.N. Charter expressly forbids the organization from interfering in
the domestic affairs of sovereign states.9 Yet when we survey the
globe, the vast number of existing armed conflicts are within nations, not between them-thus creating a mediation gap.
The INN was developed in 1987 to fill the mediation gap. It
was initiated by President Carter together with other international
leaders who envisioned the growing need for a new approach to
the resolution of prevalent intra-national conflicts. Reduced to its
essence, the INN is a network linking the convening ability of a
council of eminent persons with the resources of various organizations and individuals. While the INN is headquartered at The
Carter Center's Programs on Conflict Resolution, the permanent
staff is intentionally small. The INN does not attempt to perform
in-house all the services it offers to disputants. One of its principal
strengths is its ability to borrow other organizational support or
match disputants' needs with existing resources not previously
available to them. In addition to President Carter, the Chair,
members of the INN Council include:
Oscar Arias S;Inchez, former President of Costa Rica
Olusegun Obasanjo, former President of Nigeria
Lisbet Palme, Swedish Committee for UNICEF
Javier Perz de Cu~llar, former U.N. Secretary-General
Shridath Ramphal, former Secretary-General of the Commonwealth
Nations
Marie-Ang~lique Savan6, Office of e U.N. High Commissionerfor
Refugees

SPENCER & SPENCER, supra note 4, at 9-10.
9 "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under
Chapter VII." I THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 9 (1991).
8
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Eduard Shevardnadze, former Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R.
Desmond Tutu, Archbishop of Cape Town, South Africa
Cyrus Vance, former Secretary of State
Elie Wiesel, Elie Wiesel Foundationfor Humanity
Andrew Young, former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.
When a request for assistance is received, the Conflict Resolution program staff makes an initial survey of existing network
nodes to determine the most compatible match of convener(s),
content and process experts, and other resources to meet the
disputants needs. The INN's role can range from mere linkages
(or hand-offs) to hands-on mediation, negotiation, or other forms
of direct involvement. The PDRE/EPLF is a case where the INN
had both direct involvement in the mediation effort as well as
performed linkage services drawing academics, practitioners, and
nongovernmental organizations into the overall approach.
'"The Forgotten War" is a label that has been applied to the
conflict between the PDRE and the EPLF. It was one of the longest running civil wars in African history, raging for thirty years,
and yet remained relatively unknown except to scholars and relief
workers. In 1989, the INN spear-headed negotiations between the
PDRE and the EPLF, seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
From the mediation process, the INN gained valuable experience
applicable to both the theory and the practice of conflict resolution.
This Article addresses the mediation gap and uses Ethiopia/Eritrea as a case study to draw some .preliminary generalizations. It is offered as a means of understanding and conceptualizing the complex phenomena and issues identified during the
actual mediation of the PDRE/EPLF dispute. The orientation is
applied and practical. The descriptive account that follows is intended to examine what worked, what did not, the political context, and how the INN's model of conflict resolution could be
further utilized. The data are extracted from a variety of sources
ranging from field notes, key informant interviews, meeting records, site observations, scholarly monographs, ethnographies,
media reports, official documents, and personal diaries.
II.

OVERVIEW OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCEDURES

The Carter Center's Program on Conflict Resolution monitors
existing and emerging intra-national conflicts (e.g., ongoing collection of the information/data and dissemination of the weekly
updates); convenes confidential consultations for disputants and
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mediators; matches disputants' needs with potential third parties,
funding sources, and professional experts; performs premediation
services including analysis of issues, generation of options and
building of trust;"0 mediates civil conflicts;" and convenes academic and practitioner conferences. Due to the complexity, duration, intensity of the PDRE/EPLF conflict, along with the low
probability of success, the mediation efforts took the form of an
integrated, multipath, multiphased process. The strategy was to
provide a detour around any barrier encountered on any one path
to keep the negotiations in progress. All of the paths we pursued
fell into the category of processes often referred to as "Track Two
Diplomacy."
There were four paths to our approach. Path One-the formal path, described as being "on the record," 2 was the decisionmaking path wherein we -worked directly with the parties. The
chairperson of the peace process, President Carter, managed this
path. Path Two-the informal, working relations path, involved
coordination of external levers (e.g., the United States and the
Soviet Union, regional organizations, etc.), to influence the negotiating parties. Barriers to the negotiations occurring on Path One
could be removed through Path Two. Path Three-joint working
groups, such as the World Bank and development agencies, were
designed to create a stream of decidable questions on interim
measures and specific issues (e.g., development package, procedures for the negotiations, and famine relief). This path was the
least developed due to the later interruption of the peace process.
Path Four-the academic analysis dealing with long-term interests

10 For example, at the 1992 INN Consultation conducted in Atlanta this January
there were over 200 participants from almost 40 countries, representing more than 150
organizations. Apart from the other general sessions (i.e., Psychological Dimensions and
Sustaining the Peace), the intra-national conflicts in eight countries/areas were
spotlighted in the organized working sessions, which included Afghanistan, Angola, Burma, Cambodia, Cyprus, the Korean Peninsula, Liberia, and Sudan. The topical categories
of each session included conflict causes, resolution barriers, strategies, resources, and
action steps. For a detailed report and analysis, see 3 RESOLVING INTRA-NATIONAL CONFLITS: A STRENGTHENED ROLE FOR NON-GOVERNMENTAL.ACTORS

(1991); see also Honggang

Yang, The PracticalImportance of National CharacterStudies, 19 So. ANTHROPOLOGIsT 1, 15-16
(1992).
"11 See Dayle E. Powell, Conflict Resolution Symposium Derails a Potential Tobacco
"War," 5
NEGOTIATION J. 75, 75-82 (1989).
12 The parties felt so little trust for each other that they required us to tape record
their negotiating sessions, transcribe the tapes, and give each party a copy. The official
transcript remained with President Carter.
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and ways to meet them (e.g., elections and constitutional reform),
would include proposals of joint gains for the parties.
Within these four paths, we conducted four different strategies:
(1) The bargaining strategy involved President Carter's role as

a master negotiator. We also used the lever of world opinion to
keep the parties at the table.
(2) The single negotiating text strategy was the principal means
of seeking agreement. President Carter had previously employed this strategy, whose feature is a dovetailing of the interests of the warring parties through assistance from the third
party at Camp David.'
(3) The joint problem-solving strategy was employed less in the
negotiating room than in private sessions and off-the-record
discussions. The approach was to give three of us, the two
delegations and the mediation team, a shared problem to be
solved. We were all partners in the process.
(4) The eminent persons strategy was used to get the parties to
the table and hold them there throughout the negotiations. It
has unique characteristics: immediate access to leaders and to
data; ability to borrow infrastructure support without the usual
attendant organizational encumbrances; and the use of media
attention to enhance the negotiating environment.
The mediation process had five identifiable phases: (a) test
viability of third party roles; (b) secure commitment from the
parties; (c) negotiate procedural issues; (d) negotiate substantive
issues; (e) develop external incentives/levers. Each of these phases
contained sub-phases for which the mediation team and their
advisors formulated strategies.
The role of the eminent person is perhaps the single most
important characteristic of the INN approach. As world leaders,
members of the INN Council have tremendous access and leverage. They have the ability, trust, credibility, and charismatic authority to persuade conflicting parties to go to the negotiating
table and to keep them engaged in a process once it has begun.
Even though INN was ultimately unsuccessful in resolving the
PDRE/EPLF conflict, President Carter's influence was most likely a
major determinant for the success which was achieved. In the next
Part, we will provide a brief history of the conflict and the peace
talks that took place under the aegis of the INN.

13

See JIMMY CARTER, KEEPING FAITH: MEMOIRS oF A PRESIDENT 267-429 (1982).
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III.

THE PDRE/EPLF NEGOTIATIONS

A.

Historical Background

Ethiopia is orie of Africa's oldest civilizations and the seat of
Africa's symbol of the pacific resolution of conflicts-the Organization of African Unity ("OAU"). 4 Over the last hundred years this
loosely knit state has brought different nationalities (e.g., Eritreans,
Somalis, Oromos, Tigreans) under the imperial rule of an essen15
tially feudalist Amharic ruling class.
Ethnic conflicts have been recurrent in Ethiopia where
Eritrea, facing the political and cultural predominance of the
Amharans, has had the strongest claim to self-determination. In
recent history, both the Amharans and the Eritreans were victims
of colonialism. Ethiopia was colonized for five years by the Italians,
and Eritrea was under the colonial rule of Italy from the late
1880s until 1941. The 1889 treaty of Wuchale between Italy and
Ethiopia established Eritrea's borders as they exist today. The
Eritrean territory was a concession to the Italians in exchange for
their agreement not to colonize other parts of Ethiopia. 6
For the last three decades, the Eritreans have waged a guerrilla campaign against the armies of Ethiopia. The resistance movement evolved into the EPLF. When asked for, the three most important issues that must be resolved to attain peace,, the EPLF
answered "self-determination, self-determination, and self-determination." Conversely, when questioned about the principle behind
its fight against the EPLF, the PDRE response was "national unity
7
and sovereignty."'
After years of perpetual civil war, Ethiopia is now among the
poorest countries in the world, spending seventy percent of its

14 The Organization's Charter was signed in May, 1963, in Addis Ababa by the
heads of state or government of 30 countries of Africa and Madagascar. The present
membership of the OAU comprises 50 African countries, including Madagascar and other
islands surrounding Africa. The main organs are the Assembly of the heads of State and
Government, the Council of Ministers, the General Secretariat, and the Commission of
Mediation. "The Organization's basic principles are the equality of members, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes
." See GIUSEPPE SCHIAVONE, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 229-31 (2d. ed., 1987).

15 Peter A. Nyong'o, The Implications of Crises and- Conhlict in the Upper Nile Valley, in
CONFUCT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA 95, 96-102 (Francis M. Deng & I. William Zartman eds.,
1991).
16 SPENCER & SPENCER, supra note 4, at 11-12.
17 Id These responses are based on the authors' field notes.
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Gross National Product for military needs while maintaining the
largest standing army in sub-Saharan Africa. The losses for both
Ethiopia and Eritrea have been staggering. Eritrean children go to
school in caves underground, when possible. For three generations
the Eritreans have experienced only a steady onslaught of bombing raids, death, and destruction. While the world watched in
horror between 1984 and 1985, a deadly famine struck Ethiopia.
Recurrent drought and famine continue to strike the region which
development to adequately feed
lacks the necessary infrastructure
18
and care for its people.
B.

The Peace Talks

The INN began its concentration on the PDRE and the EPLF
conflict almost a full year before initially convening the parties.
Following a working session with a group of scholars, the INN
Secretariat began an analysis of the historical, political, economic,
and cultural aspects of the conflict. We tried to overcome the
biases found in the written analyses' 9 and conducted a number
of preliminary interviews with scholars, policy analysts, and relief
agencies to gain knowledge and insight into the sociocultural
differences of the parties. Later, we convened several highly targeted briefing sessions to discuss approaches and frameworks for a
mediation initiative. One of the prerequisites for INN involvement
is being invited in by all major parties. To meet directly with the
leadership of both sides and explore opportunities for a peaceful
solution, we made a field trip to the Horn of Africa in the spring
of 1989.
As a result of our trip, both the PDRE and EPLF leadership
extended invitations to begin a mediation process. We learned
that both sides wished the international community to be informed of their negotiations. One of the initial conclusions was
that the conflict was virtually intractable. At one level, our strategy
was to devise and implement steps to transform the members of

18

See JASON W.

CLAY & BONNIE K. HOLCOMB, POLITICS AND THE ETHIOPIAN FAMINE:

1984-1985 (1986); JASON W. CLAY ET AL., THE SPOILS OF FAMINE: ETHIOPIAN FAMINE POLICY AND PEASANT AGRICULTURE (1988); THE LONG STRUGGLE OF ERITREA FOR INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTRUCrIVE PEACE (Lionel Cliffe & Basil Davidson eds., 1988); DAW1T W.
GIORGIS, RED TEARS: WAR, FAMINE AND

REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA (1989).

19 We found that many analyses were written with a clear bias for one side or the
other. An effort was made to read an equal amount of biased reports to better understand the perceptions the parties had about themselves and each other. See SPENCER &
SPENCER, supra note 4, at 12-13.
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the negotiation team from warriors into problem solvers. At another level, we realized that because the parties were so entrenched
in their adversarial roles, our best approach might be to create a
process that would be used by the parties for their own purposes
but which would result in a temporary cessation of the fighting,
saving lives in the short term. We hoped that changing circumstances would lead to long-term options for peace.
The principal INN objectives in this effort were fourfold: to
act as'a catalyst, to create conditions for progress, to reach an
agreement for an extended cease-fire, and to act where governments and regional organizations had been unable to act. We
devised the multipath, multiphased approach- discussed previously
20
in order to meet these objectives.
In September, 1989, under INN auspices, representatives of
the EPLF and the PDRE attempted to negotiate a peaceful settlement to their conflict. The parties placed only three requirements
on the peace process: first, that *itbe conducted by a neutral third
party; second, that the talks be made public; third, that no preconditions be set by either side. In compliance with their ground
rules, each negotiating session began and ended with a highly
publicized, and often highly divisive, press conference. The parties
would frequently use the media opportunity to castigate each other.
Representatives from each side spent two weeks together at
the Carter Center of Emory University in Atlanta. Convened by
'former President Carter, the parties worked on preliminary agreements that would provide the framework for later substantive talks.
In November and December of 1989, the parties met for a second
round of preliminary negotiations in Nairobi, Kenya. Again under
the leadership of President Carter, they worked for over a week
on the remaining preliminary issues. At the end of the Nalrobi
peace talks, both sides signed an agreement on fourteen procedural matters including language, venue, agenda, record keeping, and
publicity.
Following the two rounds of procedural negotiations, the
remaining unresolved issues were fairly straightforward-would the
U.N. accept an invitation to serve as an observer if it were invited
by only one party, the EPLF, and would observers merely be witnesses or would they also serve as mediators. Initially, the U.N.

20

Sm supra Part II.
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would not accept unless invited by both sides, relying on the prohibition in the U.N. Charter.2 This presented the negotiation team
with a procedural Catch-22. The only way to reach an agreement
on the observer question was through a mathematical formulation
that allowed each side a limited number of unrestricted choices,
combined with certain jointly chosen observers. The PDRE had
maintained that the conflict was an internal affair of a sovereign
nation and not within the purview of either regional or international organizations. The EPLF exercised its unilateral choices to
name the U.N. and OAU as observers. However, the EPLF radio
also broadcast the mathematical formulation for the selection.
Knowing that it was not invited by the government of Ethiopia,
the U.N. declined to accept the invitation because Ethiopia is a
member-nation. The EPLF used the U.N. refusal to attend the
substantive peace talks- as a partial justification for the resumption
of its military offensive. Only when the PDRE government was substantially weakened by the combined EPLF/TPLF (the Tigrean
People's Liberation Front) military assaults did it capitulate on the
observer question and authorize President Carter to invite the
U.N. on behalf of both the PDRE and the EPLF.
C. An Interruption of The Peace Process
When the issue of the selection of observers was negotiated,
the military situation was shifting in favor of the EPLF and the
TPLF. Throughout the peace process, while there had been a de
facto cease-fire between the PDRE and the EPLF, the TPLF forces
continued their inexorable military move toward Addis Ababa. The
Ethiopian army, weakened by the continued TPLF attacks, gradually began to lose ground, and the Eritrean rebels launched a reinvigorated assault in the areas surrounding Asmara and Massawa in
early February, 1990.

21

See EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK supra, note 9, at 9. The response from the United

Nations' Secretary General was the following:
It has always been standard policy for the United Nations to refrain from involvement in any disputes other than those between member nations. Only on a
few rare occasions, after thorough debate in the U.N. General Assembly and an
affirmative vote in the U.N. Security Council, have we ever departed from this

policy. Therefore, the United Nations must refrain from serving as an observer
or in any other official capacity in the peace negotiations between the Govern-

ment of Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front .
SPENCER & SPENCER; sura note 4, at 25.

...
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On June 4, 1990, the Ethiopian government agreed to extend
an invitation to the U.N. to serve as an observer. The co-chairmen
notified the parties that since all the barriers had finally been
removed, the first round of substantive talks would begin in Nairobi on July 6. However, the EPLF withdrew from the peace process
on June 11. Their appeal now was to the U.N. to conduct a referendum in Eritrea as the only means for a just and peaceful solution. The military operations by the EPLF and the newly formed
EPRDF, an umbrella organization that included the former TPLF,
were renewed with vigor. The armies of the Ethiopian government
began to suffer one crushing blow after another until Mengistu
Haile Mariam was forced to flee the capital and the EPRDF took
control, establishing a transitional government. In a parallel way,
the EPLF seized Asmara, the capital city of Eritrea, and established
its own transitional government. Each side has now scheduled national elections to be held in two years.
Although the negotiation initiative by the INN was interrupted, the renewed fighting did not end our commitment to either
the parties or the region. We have maintained a line of communication with both sides and more recently the Carter Center has
sent a delegation of legal scholars and human rights experts to
Addis Ababa to assist the transitional government in the interim
period before national elections are held.
IV.

LESSONS

Peace talks seem to be most fruitful without the spotlight
effect and constant posturing caused by the presence of mass
media, although in this case the parties were unwilling to engage
in the negotiations without such exposure. The interest of the
press in the peace talks served ultimately as a strong incentive for
both parties to show good faith in staying in the peace process. At
the same time, each round of negotiations required damage control after the press conference, due to the parties' use of the
media for blaming, labeling, and other divisive tactics.22 If an early agreement can be reached to have a totally private negotiation,
or at a minimum, an agreement not to make a public statement
during the sessions, progress can be achieved more readily.
22 The PDRE did not want to take the EPLF seriously and considered them "bandits." The EPLF were extremely distrustful of the government and wanted international
recognition above all else, because it lent support to their claim for autonomy or independence.
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Direct participation and joint actions of all of the major parties should be encouraged. The negotiating parties in this case
might have included players such as the TPLF,2 s who were then
involved in parallel negotiations with the PDRE mediated by the
Italian government. There was communication between the two
ongoing negotiations, but the outcome might have been different
had all of the parties been brought together in light of the similar
military stand taken by the EPLF and the TPLF. The continued
TPLF gains on the battlefield became one of the determinants for
the peace process at the negotiations between the EPLF and the
PDRE.
The creation of gains for both sides will greatly assist the
parties in dealing with public opinion back home: Gains need to
be seen by the parties as being greater than the cost of staying
engaged in the conflict. It is important that both sides leave the
negotiations feeling like winners. 4 Our efforts to develop such
joint gains for the PDRE and the EPLF never reached complete
fruition 21 since the process was interrupted before they were fully
developed.
The third party should realize that the negotiating parties may
have hidden agendas that can impact the process. In the case of
Ethiopia/Eritrea, thirty years of bitter fighting left the groups
extremely reluctant to be at the negotiating table together. Each
was using the media attention generated by the talks to advance
their cause. Either could have used the lull in fighting occasioned
by the negotiations to strengthen their military position to prepare
for a massive strike if the talks broke down. It is not uncommon

23 According to Max Peberdy, in 1975 various groups of Tigreans began to organize
resistance to the government of Ethiopia. Faced by a well-armed central government they
felt there was no alternative to an armed struggle. A number of liberation movements
developed within the province but it was the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TrPLF")
which eventually became an effective military and political force. See MAX PEBERDY,
TIGRAY, ETHzOPIA's UNTOLD STORY 15-16 (1985).
24 For an insigltful analysis, see ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING To YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WrrIHOuT GIVING IN 42-43 (1981). The book discusses the case
of Israel and Egypt negotiating over who should keep how much of the Sinai Peninsula,
illustrating both a major problem in negotiation and a key opportunity. The problem is
a common one. There seems to be no way to split the pie that leaves both parties satisfied. Thus, Fisher and Ury suggest the following: do not bargain over positions; separate
the people from the problem; focus on interests, not positions; invent options for mutual
gain; and insist on using objective criteria.
25 "Our efforts included working with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as well as large donors to develop a kind of peace dividend, a major development package that could be introduced when there was a peaceful solution to the confliCL" SPENCER & SPENCER, supra note 4, at 35-36.
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in such protracted conflicts for the parties to leverage the process
to secuie gains on the battlefield and in the battle for public
opinion. The EPLF may have been "playing the talks" as merely a
part of a larger, master strategy to at last have their case heard by
the United Nations, the court of last resort. This would certainly
explain their choice of the U.N. as an observer and their insistence that all observers not only witness, but also mediate.
,The importance of sociocultural differences cannot be overlooked. Third parties are rarely able to create a solution that will
be as acceptable as one coming from the participants. Those who
"own" the conflict will know the best approaches to ending it.
Moreover, there will be less resistance to solutions that come from
the parties than from those that are seen as being imposed on
them. The direct participation in designing their own solutions is
correlated with the empowerment of the parties to solve their own
problems. As a corollary, the third party must be careful to give
both sides credit when progress is made during the negotiations
so that one side or another is not seen as taking all the credit
when the continued progress depends on both.
We attempted to work with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to provide a major development package
that could be introduced when a peaceful solution materialized, in
essence, a carrot to offer as a negotiation incentive. These kinds
of incentives can be tied to the negotiations so that the parties
will see a direct benefit attributable to a specific agreement. They
could even be developed in ,a sliding scale way so as to give greater incentives for major progress.
The role of a third party acceptable to all is correlated with
its perceived neutrality and fairness. It is imperative that there be
a clear understanding of the role of any third party, whether it be
as a mediator, as an observer, or some other capacity; and that
there be close communication with all sides in the dispute. We
realize that the role of any individual is limited by his or her
personal, social or political background, mortality, and acceptability to the parties in particular contexts. Therefore, the INN has
expanded its original concept of using a single eminent person to
convene a series of mediations, to developing a cadre of such
eminent persons who might conduct more negotiations or use
their combined influence to transform political thinking on regional and global levels.
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CONCLUSION

Toward A Third-Party Assistance Model
in Conflict Resolution

While we did not achieve our ultimate goal-a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the PDRE and the EPLF-what we
set in motion may be more significant in the long run than a
single solution to a particular conflict. Some of the successes of
the PDRE/EPLF negotiations include: (1) bringing the parties to
the negotiating table after three decades of fighting, (2) stopping
the fighting for a period of more than ten months, (3) achieving
several breakthroughs in famine relief and access to the areas, (4)
legitimizing the supportive role that third parties can play, (5)
wedding the highly visible convening power of eminent persons
with mediation approaches, (6) helping achieve a new level of
parity among the parties, (7) catalyzing the involvement of other
nations in the peace-making processes, and (8) enhancing the
explorations of intra-national conflict resolution.
It is crucial to sum up the experiences and lessons accumulated in the past years of our practices in light of future reactions.
Some of the retrospective analyses have been made.26 A third
party assistance model is being developed which is consistent with
the following set of concepts, circumstances, and corresponding
27
relationships.
Contextual attributes: Studying the historical, regional, social,
economic, political, legal, and cultural issues with reference to the
emergence of intra-national conflict.
Conflict de facto: Taking conflict as a substantive problem, and
raising procedural considerations concerning its resolution.
Identifying common interests, recognizing native viewpoints, framing issues, generating alternatives, and devising options of settlement.

26 See Powell, supra note 11, at 75-82; SPENCER & SPENCER, supra note 4. For the
methodological considerations, see THE CRAFT OF SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY (A.L. Epstein
ed., 1967); P.H. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE
(1979); Stephen J. Stedman, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa: A Conceptual Framework, in CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA, supra note 15, at 367-99.
27 This conceptual model is modified from the work of Honggang Yang. For more

details of the conceptual development, see Honggang Yang, Management of the Commons by
a Homeowners Association 35-36 (1991)

Florida-Tampa).
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Conveners: Using eminent persons to serve as mediators, bringing their political influence, background, and neutrality to bear on
the conflict and matching this with the unique conflict situation
and the disputants' needs.
Mobilization of resources: Gaining access to, and utilizing relevant political leadership, financial institutions, information, expert
advice, mass media, and infrastructure support at different levels.
Inieractive processes: Exploring the social relationships among
parties, initiating ,the mediation, encouraging direct participation
and joint actions, getting. parties to the table, holding parties at
the table, empowerment of parties, building of trust, and promotion of agreement and cooperative elements.
The model described herein is evolutionary in nature and
intentionally flexible. It serves to inform and stimulate our thinking and action. Our experience in the Horn of Africa and in
many other conflict areas convinces us that there is no set formulation that is universally applicable. Instead, we have, learned that
each case is unique and brings not only cultural challenges, but
political, economic, and societal ones as well.. We conclude from
our experiences that one of the best ways of reaching the right
formula for the process of the negotiations is to make the design
an interactive one-allowing the parties to shape not only the
substantive agreements but the procedural paths toward reaching
them as well.
B. Self-Determination And National Sovereignty
The efforts to close the mediation gap by the INN also present certain dilemmas of cultural values, norms, and perceptions.
Conflict resolution cannot avoid responding to some value and
normative issues that are very complex in reality. 28 In the
PDRE/EPLF negotiations, we tried to be aware of how the parties'
cultural values impacted on the negotiations at the level of cultural perceptions and political reality. In years of repeated attempts
to have the United Nations resume its jurisdiction, the EPLF were
rebuffed by the barriers created by Article 2 (Section 7) of the
Charter. When the Organization of African Unity was established,
its charter provided that it had been organized to defend sover-

28 Crawford Young, Self-Determination, Tenitoaial Integrity, and the African State System, in
CONFLICr RESOLUTION IN AFRICA, supra'note 15, at 320-46.
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eignty and territorial integrity of African States.' This created a
double bind for the EPLF and helped account for the protracted
duration of the conflict and the ultimate military resolution.
Conflict methodology is geared toward issues arising from
structural inequality, sociocultural problems, and prevalent oppression." As previously discussed, the EPLF highly values self-determination. This is the inevitable result of the Eritreans' suffering
from the lack of autonomy for almost three decades. Conversely,
the PDRE repeatedly elaborates its basic principle of national unity
and sovereignty.
It is this consideration of national sovereignty that prevents
the U.N. and other international/regional organizations from becoming involved in the resolution of intra-national conflicts. The
governments of sovereign nations that created those organizations
resist what they perceive as interventionism in their own affairs.
Our initiative was qualitatively different from "interventionism" in
that we received invitations from the warring factions before the
mediation efforts commenced.
Many of the armed conflicts that third parties attempt to
resolve are perceived by one of the parties as an internal matter
(within national boundary) whereas the other party (i.e. often the
rebels) perceives the conflict as an external one, between two
states. Thus, the two principles of respecting self-determination
and maintaining national sovereignty that seem internationally
acknowledged are paradoxical in implementation in the real
world.
This paradox is particularly present in the EPLF/PDRE case
because the joinder of Eritrea with Ethiopia following the Italian
colonial occupation was achieved through a United Nations resolution which reserved jurisdiction over the case should problems
arise from federation. The dramatic changes seen in the past year
in the break-up of the Soviet Union and the shift toward democracy in Eastern Europe show that managing intra-national conflicts
will continue to present challenges for the coming years in ethnicbased disputes as well as political and territorial based conflicts.
Over time, these developments may lead to a restructuring of
international and regional organizations to enable them to more
effectively address intra-national conflicts. For the interim, there is

29
30

See EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK, supra note 9, at 190-93.
RICHARD M. HESSLER ET AL., cONFucT, CONSENSUS AND EXCHANGE, SOCIAL PROB-

LEMs, 320-29 (1980).

1992)
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a continuing need to address such conflicts within the existing
systems. While the model presented herein is one way of trying to
bridge the mediation gap, there are also many others. The Notre
Dame Law Review performs an important function when it gathers
the conflict resolution community together to explore alternative
models and inform each other's thinking as well as practices.

